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We investigate the extent to which monetary policy can enhance the functioning of
the private credit system. Speci￿cally, we characterize the optimal return on money in
the presence of credit arrangements. There is a dual role for credit: It allows buyers
to trade without ￿at money and also permits them to borrow against future income.
However, not all traders have access to credit. As a result, there is a social role for
￿at money because it allows agents to self-insure against the risk of not being able to
use credit in some transactions. We consider a (nonlinear) monetary mechanism that
is designed to enhance the credit system. An active monetary policy is su¢ cient for
relaxing credit constraints. Finally, we characterize the optimal monetary policy and
show that it necessarily entails a positive in￿ ation rate, which is required to induce
cooperation in the credit system.
JEL classi￿cation: E4, E5.
Keywords: Fiat money; private credit; costly recordkeeping; imperfect public infor-
mation; optimal monetary policy.
11. INTRODUCTION
In most modern economies, we have observed the rise of credit arrangements as a means
of payment in the past two decades. Consequently, the increased number of transactions
involving some kind of credit instrument has fundamentally changed the way in which
economists approach monetary economies, leading to a growing literature that investigates
the implications of the use of both ￿at money and credit as a means of payment. Some
papers in this literature include: Shi (1996); Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998); Cavalcanti
and Wallace (1999a, 1999b); Aiyagari and Williamson (2000); Corbae and Ritter (2004);
Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007); Mills (2007); Telyukova and Wright (2008); and
Sanches and Williamson (2010).
Some economists have even argued that ￿at money is likely to be displaced by other
forms of money in the near future. Woodford (2000) provides a useful survey of the debate
and discusses some of the implications for monetary policy. The main reason to believe
that ￿at money is still useful in transactions is twofold. First, it is costly to implement any
kind of credit arrangement. For instance, the use of credit requires the construction of a
record of transactions as well as the creation of a legal framework to enforce the repayment
of liabilities, devoting a signi￿cant amount of resources to these activities. Second, the
conduct of monetary policy is likely to a⁄ect the agents￿incentives to use the private credit
system, even in a world in which the use of credit as a means of payment is predominant.
In this paper, we take the view that ￿at money complements the use of credit in trans-
actions and investigate the extent to which monetary policy can enhance the functioning of
the credit system. Speci￿cally, we want to characterize the optimal return on money in a
world in which private credit and ￿at money coexist as alternative means of payment.
We construct a model in which traders have access to a costly technology that allows
them to publicly report their transactions. As a result, these agents may be willing to
voluntarily report (at a cost) their trades, together with their identities, to others if such an
action allows them to have access to credit. Because agents cannot commit to their future
promises and trading opportunities arrive at random, a centralized settlement system along
2the lines of Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999) is su¢ cient to enforce the repayment
of private liabilities. The record-keeping technology to which agents have access in our
model is similar to the one in Monnet and Roberds (2008), Nosal and Rocheteau (2011),
and Li (2011). In particular, a subset of sellers have the ability to verify the identity of
their trading partners and publicly report their transactions. If a buyer trades with one of
these sellers, then he can choose whether he wants to have his trade reported to others at a
cost. If the buyer chooses to report his trade, then he can induce the seller to produce more
goods than what his money balances allow him to purchase because he can also promise to
make a repayment at a future date.
Alternative credit arrangements have been studied in the literature. In particular, search-
theoretic models such as Shi (1996) and Corbae and Ritter (2004) have addressed the issue
of the coexistence of ￿at money and credit. These authors focus on decentralized credit
arrangements that rely either on long-term relationships [Corbae and Ritter (2004)] or on
the pledge of collateral [Shi (1996)] to induce cooperation in the credit system. As opposed
to these authors, we analyze a centralized credit system that also has the advantage of
allowing a central bank to implement certain kinds of policies. We want to focus on the
implications of these policies for the functioning of the credit system.
As a benchmark, we characterize the equilibrium allocations in a pure credit economy.
Because not all sellers are able to publicly report their trades (due to a technological re-
striction), buyers face consumption risk when trading bilaterally. Also, because of limited
commitment, there can be equilibria in which buyers are credit-constrained, in which case
they consume less than the unconstrained e¢ cient quantity. Then, we show that the in-
troduction of ￿at money allows buyers to self-insure against the risk of being matched
with a seller who is unable to o⁄er him credit. The introduction of ￿at money eliminates
consumption risk, but the quantity consumed is below the unconstrained e¢ cient quantity.
We conclude that there may be a role for policy intervention. It is now critical to de￿ne
the way in which the government or monetary authority can intervene in the economy.
In particular, we impose two constraints on the implementation of policies. First, any
intervention must result in a net transfer of assets to private agents in order to respect
3incentive compatibility. This is in line with Andolfatto (2010), who imposes voluntary
trade as a restriction on the set of incentive-feasible policies to rule out lump-sum tax as an
instrument.1 In addition to voluntary trade, it makes sense in our environment to impose a
second constraint on the government￿ s ability to interact with private agents: Any transfer
of assets to private agents must be conditional on the available public information. We
motivate this constraint on the government policies as essentially a technological restriction
that limits the extent to which the government can make transfers to private agents to alter
the rate of return on money. We believe this is a relevant constraint in the context of a
credit economy in which it is costly to report private trades. Furthermore by considering this
extra constraint, we are imposing that the government is not endowed with extra costless
informational resources while still preserving the underlying frictions faced by private agents.
Andolfatto (2010) has shown that a nonlinear monetary mechanism involving the payment
of interest on money holdings can implement the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation in a pure
monetary economy even if lump-sum taxes cannot be used as an instrument. By making
interest payments to money holders, it is possible to equalize the real rate of return on money
with the rate of time preference (the Friedman rule). Andolfatto￿ s mechanism allows the
monetary authority to control, in the long run, both the real return on money and the
in￿ ation rate. His results critically depend on the monetary authority￿ s ability to evenly
raise the real return on money across all money holders. We restrict attention to the same
monetary mechanism and add the restriction that interest payments can be made only to
those who report their trades. As a result, the monetary authority is unable to uniformly
raise the real return on money across all money holders so that we preserve a social role for
credit arrangements.
In the presence of the implementation restrictions we have described, we show that an
active monetary policy is su¢ cient for relaxing the credit constraints. By e⁄ectively raising
the real return on money for the subgroup of agents who currently have the opportunity
of trading within the credit/payment system, the monetary authority guarantees that the
1This approach is also in line with recent research on optimal taxation such as Golosov, Kocherlakota,
Tsyvinski (2003) and Kocherlakota (2005).
4unconstrained e¢ cient quantity is traded in each bilateral match in which buyers are able to
use credit. Because a de￿ ationary policy is not incentive-feasible, the monetary authority is
unable to (indirectly) raise the real return on money for those who currently do not have an
opportunity of using the credit/payment system. As a result, it cannot completely eliminate
consumption risk so that the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation is not incentive-feasible.
We then characterize the optimal monetary policy. We show that equalizing the real rate
of return on money with the rate of time preference (Friedman rule) is incentive-feasible only
for those who currently have an opportunity of using the credit/payment system. Moreover,
this is only a necessary condition for optimality. Another property of the optimal monetary
policy is to have a positive in￿ ation rate. In particular, the monetary authority should
optimally choose the minimum in￿ ation rate that ensures that buyers who use credit have
the incentive to fully repay their debts.
Why is it necessary to have a positive in￿ ation rate? Introducing ￿at money into a credit
economy gives agents an alternative (decentralized) mechanism to trade. As we have seen,
￿at money allows agents to self-insure against the risk of not being able to use credit in some
transactions, and their ability to self-insure crucially depends on the real return on money.
It is very di¢ cult to induce buyers to repay their liabilities when the alternative to credit
is trading with ￿at money in an environment in which the in￿ ation rate is virtually zero
(especially if buyers are su¢ ciently patient). For this reason, a slightly positive in￿ ation
rate is required to support cooperation in the credit system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model. In
section 3, we characterize equilibria for the pure credit economy. In section 4, we introduce
￿at money and study its implications for the credit system. In sections 5 and 6, we charac-
terize the optimal monetary policy. In section 7, we discuss the properties of the optimal
policy and the nature of our monetary mechanism. Section 8 concludes.
52. THE MODEL
2.1. Agents
Our framework builds on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
There is a continuum of in￿nitely lived buyers and sellers. Each buyer is indexed by i 2 [0;1]
and each seller is indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Time is discrete, and each period is divided into two
subperiods: day and night. Within each subperiod, there is a unique perishable consumption
good that is produced and consumed. In the day subperiod, a seller does not want to
consume but can produce one unit of the consumption good with one unit of e⁄ort; a buyer
wants to consume but is unable to produce. In the night subperiod, both types want to
consume and are able to produce one unit of the consumption good with one unit of e⁄ort.
Each agent is endowed with N units of e⁄ort. Neither a buyer nor a seller can commit to
his or her promises.
A buyer has preferences given by:
u(qi) + ci ￿ ni, (1)
where qi 2 R+ is his consumption in the day subperiod, ci is his consumption in the night
subperiod, and ni 2 R is his production in the night subperiod. Assume that u : R+ ! R+ is
strictly concave, increasing, and continuously di⁄erentiable, with u(0) = 0 and u0 (0) = 1.
A seller has the following utility function over goods and e⁄ort:
￿qj + cj ￿ nj, (2)
where qj 2 R+ is her production in the day subperiod, cj is her consumption in the night
subperiod, and nj 2 R is her production in the night subperiod. Buyers and sellers have a
common discount factor between periods, which we denote by ￿ 2 (0;1).
2.2. Markets
Agents trade in two sequential markets in every period. In the day market, agents are
randomly and bilaterally matched in such a way that each buyer meets a seller. In the
6night market, agents interact in a centralized location where the terms of trade are given
by competitive pricing. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), we refer to the ￿rst market as the
decentralized market and to the second market as the centralized market.
2.3. Recordkeeping
There are two types of sellers: connected and unconnected. A connected seller has access
to a record-keeping technology that allows her to verify the identity of her trading partner
and record her transaction during the day subperiod. Once a transaction is recorded, it can
be reported to other agents. The use of this technology costs ￿ > 0 units of the good for the
seller in the day subperiod. An unconnected seller does not have access to a record-keeping
technology and, consequently, is unable to make her interaction with her trading partner
publicly observable. There is a measure ￿ 2 [0;1] of connected sellers and a measure 1 ￿ ￿
of unconnected sellers.
Notice that a connected seller is willing to extend credit to her trading partner in the
decentralized market provided that society can enforce any repayment in the centralized
location. One possible ￿nancial arrangement is to have a seller producing for the buyer
with whom she is paired in the day subperiod in exchange for a repayment in the night
subperiod. However, a buyer cannot commit to his promise of making a repayment in the
night subperiod. To enforce the repayment of private liabilities, there must be some form
of societal punishment on defaulters. Otherwise, a seller would not be willing to produce
for a buyer in the decentralized market unless she received something tangible and valuable
in exchange (such as ￿at money). This must be the case for an unconnected seller who is
unable to make her trades publicly observable. On the other hand, a connected seller has the
ability to make her transaction with a buyer publicly observable. If a buyer does not repay
his loan, other agents in the economy will observe his defection. If there exists a mechanism
that enforces any repayment in the centralized location, a connected seller is willing to
extend credit to her trading partners in the decentralized market. In the next section, we
provide more details on the exact punishment that society can impose on defaulters.
73. A PURE CREDIT ECONOMY
In this section, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a pure credit
economy. We believe that the pure credit economy is a useful benchmark that will help us
understand the role of government policies. To enforce the repayment of private liabilities,
there is a clearinghouse that collects all reports from connected sellers during the day
subperiod. The clearinghouse is also responsible for receiving repayments from buyers and
making payments to sellers in the centralized location. Any transaction that is reported
to the clearinghouse becomes publicly observable. Because a buyer cannot commit to his
promises, the clearinghouse needs to impose some kind of punishment on him if he fails to
make a repayment. It is not possible for the clearinghouse to directly punish a buyer who
has defaulted on his loan. However, the clearinghouse can indirectly punish a defaulter by
refusing to make a payment (in the centralized location) to any seller who trades with him.
Notice that the identity of a defaulter is publicly observable. As a result, a connected seller
will not be willing to extend credit to a defaulter. To extend credit to him, the seller would
have to report their transaction, together with their identities, to the clearinghouse, which
would then refuse to make a transfer to the seller even if it received a repayment from the
buyer in the centralized location. Thus, a buyer who reneges on her liability loses access to
credit.
A buyer can choose whether to have his transaction with a connected seller reported
to the clearinghouse. If the buyer chooses not to report his trade, then credit will not
be available for him: The seller cannot enforce the repayment of a private liability in the
centralized location and, as a result, is not willing to extend credit. Therefore, no trade
takes place.
To determine the terms of trade in the decentralized market, we assume that the buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the seller, who either accepts or rejects it.2 As a result,
the buyer extracts all surplus from trade when proposing the terms of trade. This partic-
2Here we implicitly assume that it is in￿nitely costly for the buyer to make a second o⁄er to the seller if
the ￿rst one has been rejected.
8ular bargaining protocol simpli￿es the analysis without compromising the generality of our
results. In Lagos and Wright (2005), there is an ine¢ ciency arising from the generalized
Nash bargaining solution: If the seller has some bargaining power, the socially e¢ cient
allocation cannot be implemented as a monetary equilibrium.3 To concentrate on the infor-
mational frictions that we emphasize in this paper, we simplify the analysis by ruling out
any potential bargaining ine¢ cient.
3.1. Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
Consider a match between a buyer and an unconnected seller. In this case, there is no
possibility of making their trade publicly observable: The unconnected seller is unable to
report their trade to the clearinghouse because she lacks the technology to record their
transaction. As a result, such a seller is not willing to extend credit to the buyer; therefore,
no trade takes place.
3.2. Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Consider now a match between a buyer and a connected seller. Suppose initially that the
buyer chooses to have his trade reported. Let q denote the quantity of the consumption good
that the seller produces for the buyer in the day subperiod, and let l denote the repayment
amount that the buyer promises to make in the night subperiod. Thus, the terms of trade





subject to the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿q ￿ ￿ + l ￿ 0,
and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿l + v ￿ ^ v. (3)
3Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010) show that, in order to obtain the ￿rst-best allocation, ￿scal
policies need to be active.
9Here v denotes the buyer￿ s expected discounted utility at the end of the night subperiod,
and ^ v denotes his expected discounted utility upon default (given the punishment that the
clearinghouse will impose on him). Condition (3) simply says that the repayment amount l
must be such that the buyer weakly prefers to repay his loan to renege on his debt and be
punished for taking this action. The solution to this problem is as follows. If the buyer￿ s
individual rationality constraint binds (3), then l = v ￿ ^ v and q = v ￿ ^ v ￿ ￿; otherwise,
l = q￿ + ￿ and q = q￿. Let ￿r (v; ^ v) denote the buyer￿ s payo⁄ of trading with a connected
seller. Thus, we have
￿r (v; ^ v) = u(v ￿ ^ v ￿ ￿) ￿ v + ^ v,
if v < q￿ + ￿ + ^ v; and
￿r (v; ^ v) = u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿,
if v ￿ q￿ + ￿ + ^ v. Before concluding the trade, the seller sends the report f(i;j);(q;l)g to
the clearinghouse, where i 2 [0;1] is the buyer￿ s identity, j 2 [0;1] is the seller￿ s identity,
and (q;L) are the terms of trade.
If the buyer chooses not to have his trade reported, then no trade takes place for the
same reason as in the case of a meeting with an unconnected seller.
3.3. Buyer￿ s Bellman Equation
The buyer￿ s problem can be formulated in terms of the following Bellman equation:
v = ￿ [￿ maxf￿r (v; ^ v);0g + v].
Notice that a buyer trades in the decentralized market only with probability ￿. Notice also
that a buyer always has the option of not having his trade reported, in which case no trade
takes place. Thus, a trade happens if and only if the buyer￿ s payo⁄ ￿r (v; ^ v) is greater than
zero.
103.4. The Value of Defection
As we have seen, the punishment imposed by the clearinghouse results in autarky for a
buyer who reneges on his private liabilities. As we have mentioned, a buyer who defaults on
his liabilities will no longer be able to trade in the decentralized market because connected
sellers will refuse to extend him credit. Recall that the clearinghouse indirectly punishes
defaulters by refusing to send payments to connected sellers who have traded with default-
ers. This means that the clearinghouse refuses to settle any public transaction involving a
defaulter. Thus, we must have ^ v = 0.
3.5. Stationary Equilibrium
Now we are able to de￿ne an equilibrium for the pure credit economy. Throughout
the paper, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria. In particular, we can de￿ne an
equilibrium simply in terms of the value v (the buyer￿ s expected discounted utility). Once
we have determined the equilibrium value for v, we can easily recover the loan amount q
as well as the repayment amount l observed in each transaction between a buyer and a
connected seller.
De￿nition 1 A stationary equilibrium of the pure credit economy is a value v￿ satisfying
(1 ￿ ￿)v￿ = ￿￿￿r (v￿;0),
together with the condition v￿ ￿ ￿.
There can be two types of equilibria. Suppose that ￿￿u(q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿).
Then, the equilibrium value for v is given by
v￿ =
￿￿ [u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿]
1 ￿ ￿
.
In this case, the surplus-maximizing quantity q￿ is traded in each bilateral match between
a buyer and a connected seller. The repayment amount in the centralized location is given
by q￿ + ￿. The buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint does not bind so that he obtains
enough credit to get the surplus-maximizing quantity q￿ in the decentralized market.




1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
.
In this case, the quantity v￿ ￿ ￿ < q￿ is traded in each bilateral match between a buyer
and a connected seller. The repayment amount is now given by v￿. The buyer￿ s individual
rationality constraint binds so that he is credit-constrained.
3.6. Discussion
In the pure credit economy, trade only takes place in matches involving connected sellers.
Because agents cannot commit to their future promises, credit is infeasible in transactions
that cannot be publicly reported. This technological restriction introduces consumption risk
for the buyer because with probability 1￿￿ he gets zero consumption. Notice that the extent
to which consumption risk is a problem depends on the available record-keeping technology.
For instance, suppose that ￿ is very close to one. In this case, society has the ability to
record almost all transactions, which mitigates the consumption risk that buyers face in
decentralized exchange. On the other hand, if ￿ is close to zero, the consumption risk they
face is severe. Notice that a lower value for ￿ makes the case ￿￿u(q￿) < (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿)
more likely to arise, which means that not only is credit unavailable in a (relatively large)
fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of matches, but it is also restricted in the trades involving connected sellers.
The pure credit economy makes it clear why ￿at money can be socially useful. Fiat money
allows two agents to trade even though no public information about their transactions is
created. In particular, the only way to induce a seller to produce for a buyer is to have
the latter giving something tangible and valuable in exchange, in which case settlement is
immediate. As a result, the introduction of ￿at money enlarges the set of feasible trades,
mitigating consumption risk in the decentralized market. We turn to the analysis of an
economy in which ￿at money and private debt coexist as a means of payment in the next
section.
124. INTRODUCING FIAT MONEY
Suppose now that each buyer is initially endowed with ￿ M units of money. Suppose
also that there is no change in the initial stock of money; that is, there is no government
intervention. As in the previous section, a buyer can choose whether to have his transaction
with a connected seller reported to the clearinghouse. If the buyer chooses not to report his
trade, then credit will not be available for him. In this case, the seller is willing to produce
for the buyer only if she receives ￿at money in exchange. As in the pure credit economy,
a credit transaction is incentive-feasible only in a bilateral meeting between a buyer and
a connected seller. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), there is a Walrasian market in the
centralized location in which agents can trade goods for ￿at money at a competitive price.
Trades in this market are always anonymous.
4.1. Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
Consider the bargaining problem between a buyer and an unconnected seller. Let ￿t
denote the value of money in the centralized location at date t, and suppose that the buyer
has M units of money. Let (q;D) denote the terms of trade; that is, q denotes the amount
of goods that the seller produces for the buyer in exchange for D units of money. Taking





subject to the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿q + ￿tD ￿ 0, (4)
and the buyer￿ s cash constraint,
D ￿ M. (5)
The solution to this problem is as follows: q = q￿ and D = q￿=￿t if M ￿ q￿=￿t; or q = ￿tM







u(￿tM) if M < q￿=￿t;
u(q￿) if M ￿ q￿=￿t.
(6)
4.2. Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Now consider the bargaining problem between a buyer and a connected seller. First, we
describe the solution to the bargaining problem, assuming that the buyer wants to have his
trade reported. As in the previous section, let v denote the buyer￿ s expected discounted
utility at the end of the night subperiod, and let ^ v denote his expected discounted utility
upon default. The terms of trade are given by (q;L;D), where q is the quantity produced
by the seller, D is the monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller in the decentralized
market, and L is the monetary repayment that the buyer promises to make in the centralized




[u(q) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD],
subject to the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿q ￿ ￿ + ￿tL + ￿tD ￿ 0, (7)
the buyer￿ s cash constraint (5), and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿￿tL + v ￿ ^ v. (8)
Here the seller produces q units of the consumption good for the buyer in exchange for
D units of money and a promise of repayment of L units of money in the centralized
location. In the night subperiod, the buyer produces ￿tL units of the good and exchange
them in the Walrasian market for L units of money. Finally, he makes a transfer to the
clearinghouse, which in turn makes a payment L to the seller with whom he was paired
in the day subperiod. There is no cost of operating the clearinghouse other than the cost
of reporting a transaction. A seller needs to pay ￿ > 0 to report her transaction with her
trading partner in the decentralized market, which makes it harder to satisfy her individual
14rationality constraint. Because (7) holds with equality at the optimum, the buyer ends up
paying for the record-keeping cost. The bene￿t of having his trade reported is that the
buyer can consume more than what his money holdings permit him to purchase because
he can promise to make a repayment to the seller in the centralized location through the
clearinghouse. Although credit is costly for the buyer, it allows him to relax his cash
constraint.
The unconstrained solution to the bargaining problem is ￿tL+￿tD￿￿ = q￿. This means
that, if ￿tM ￿ ￿ < q￿, then we must have D = M and L > 0 at the optimum. Thus, we
can rewrite the buyer￿ s problem as
￿r
t (M;v; ^ v) = max
L￿0
[u(￿tL + ￿tM ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿tL], (9)
subject to (8). The solution to this problem is: L = (q￿ ￿ ￿tM + ￿)=￿t if q￿ ￿ ￿tM + ￿ ￿
v ￿ ^ v; or L = (v ￿ ^ v)=￿t if q￿ ￿ ￿tM + ￿ > v ￿ ^ v. Finally, the seller sends the report
f(i;j);(q;D;L)g to the clearinghouse, where i 2 [0;1] is the buyer￿ s identity, j 2 [0;1] is
the seller￿ s identity, and (q;D;L) are the terms of trade.
Suppose now that the buyer chooses not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse.
In this case, any trade proposed by the buyer involving a positive repayment amount will
be rejected by the seller. Thus, the buyer￿ s problem is the same as the one he faces when
meeting with an unconnected seller in the decentralized market.
4.3. Buyer￿ s Bellman Equation
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to stationary monetary equilibria in which
aggregate real money balances are constant over time. In this kind of equilibrium, each
buyer anticipates that the value of money in the centralized location will be constant over
time: ￿t = ￿ > 0 for all t ￿ 0. Thus, the buyer￿ s problem in the centralized location can









t+1 (M;v; ^ v);￿a
t+1 (M)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿a




t+1 (M;v; ^ v) given by (9) and ￿a
t+1 (M) given by (6). Here M is the amount of
money that the buyer acquires in the Walrasian market at date t and takes with him into
the decentralized market at date t+1. Let M￿ denote his optimal choice of money holdings
in the Walrasian market.
Now we make the same change of variables as in Sanches and Williamson (2010), which
will prove to be useful for describing an equilibrium allocation. Let y denote the buyer￿ s
daytime consumption if he reports his trade to the clearinghouse, and let x denote his





t+1 (M￿;v; ^ v) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
￿ ￿￿M￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
In this case, the buyer chooses to report his trade with a connected seller to other agents in
order to have access to credit. We can rewrite equation (10) in terms of x and y as follows:
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x],
with the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint (8) given by
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ^ v.
When making his portfolio decision in the centralized location at date t, a buyer ￿nds it
optimal to carry some currency into the decentralized market at date t+1 because he may
be matched with an unconnected seller (with probability 1 ￿ ￿). In this case, trade takes
place only if he has money to pay for his purchases. Even in a trade with a connected seller
that is reported to the clearinghouse, the buyer may use both credit and ￿at money to pay
for the amount y that the seller produces for him.




t+1 (M￿;v; ^ v) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
< ￿￿M￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
In this case, the cost associated with credit exceeds the bene￿t of trading with credit. As
a result, the buyer never reports his trade when he is paired with a connected seller. Thus,
16he always uses ￿at money to pay for his purchases in the decentralized market. We can
then rewrite equation (10) as follows:
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿x + ￿u(x),
with the value of x given by
u0 (^ x) = ￿￿1. (11)
For ￿at money and private debt to coexist as a means of payment, the following must
hold in equilibrium:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿^ x + ￿u(^ x). (12)
Otherwise, an equilibrium is one in which all trades in the decentralized market are carried
out with ￿at money only.
4.4. The Value of Defection
If a buyer fails to make a repayment in the centralized location, he will be able to use
only ￿at currency to pay for his future purchases. When a buyer fails to make a repayment,
the clearinghouse makes his defection publicly observable. This means that, if a defaulter
wants to have any of his future trades reported, his identity will be revealed to his trading
partner. The latter (a connected seller) knows that the clearinghouse will refuse to make
her a transfer in the centralized location even if a repayment is actually collected from the
buyer. Because the proposed trade would involve a positive repayment amount (otherwise,
the buyer would prefer not to report the trade), she would get a negative payo⁄if she carried
out the proposed trade. As a result, the seller will not accept the terms proposed by the
buyer. Taking this into account, a defaulter who is paired with a connected seller chooses
not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse because this option would involve a
cost without any additional bene￿t. Thus, the value of defection ^ v satis￿es the following
Bellman equation:
^ v = max
^ M2R+
n









17Let z denote the buyer￿ s consumption following defection. Then, we can rewrite (13) as
follows:
(1 ￿ ￿) ^ v = ￿z + ￿u(z).
A defaulter produces and sells z units of the consumption good in the Walrasian market in
order to acquire enough money balances at date t to purchase z units of the good in the
decentralized market at date t + 1. We have that z = ^ x, with ^ x satisfying (11).
4.5. Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
The distribution of money holdings at the end of the night subperiod is such that every
buyer holds the same amount of money and sellers carry no money into the decentralized
market. This result is a direct consequence of the quasilinearity with respect to e⁄ort and of
the fact that agents have periodic access to centralized trade; see Lagos and Wright (2005)
and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Hence, we can characterize an equilibrium allocation in
terms of the daytime consumption y of a buyer who has his trade reported and the daytime
consumption x of a buyer who does not have his trade reported, together with the daytime
consumption z that a buyer would get had he defaulted on his liabilities.
De￿nition 2 A stationary monetary equilibrium with credit is a triple (x;y;z), with z = ^ x,
satisfying the nonnegativity of the repayment amount
y ￿ x + ￿ ￿ 0, (14)
the ￿rst-order condition for the optimal choice of money balances,
￿u0 (y) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0 (x) = ￿￿1, (15)
and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿^ x + ￿u(^ x), (16)
with y = q￿ if (16) does not bind.
18Notice that (14) and (16) imply that (12) holds. An equilibrium in which ￿at money
and private debt are used as a means of payment has to be one in which a buyer who
is paired with a connected seller ￿nds it optimal to have his trade reported, despite the
costs associated with this choice. Equations (15) and (16) characterize the consumption
plans x and y. Note that if we set y = q￿, we obtain x from (15). If (14) and (16) are
satis￿ed, then the socially e¢ cient quantity q￿ is traded in each bilateral trade between a
buyer and a connected seller. Otherwise, (15) and (16) holding with equality determine
the values of x and y. If there exists no (x;y;z) satisfying (14)-(16), together with z = ^ x,
then an equilibrium is one in which all trades in the decentralized market are carried out
with ￿at money: Buyers never report their trades to the clearinghouse and, as a result,
credit disappears. In this equilibrium, the quantity ^ x is traded in every meeting in the
decentralized market. In the night subperiod, each buyer then produces ^ x and each seller
consumes ^ x.
With the introduction of ￿at money, a buyer who now ￿nds himself matched with an
unconnected seller in the decentralized market can use his money holdings to trade. Con-
sequently, ￿at money can be used to self-insure against the risk of being matched with an
unconnected seller. However, there is a limit to the extent to which buyers can use ￿at
money to self-insure. In particular, notice that, in an equilibrium in which ￿at money and
private debt coexist, we have x ￿ y, which means that a buyer who reports his trade is
able to consume more than a buyer who cannot obtain credit from his trading partner.
From a buyer￿ s standpoint, there still exists consumption risk. A buyer who trades with
an unconnected seller faces a cash constraint that can eventually bind. On the other hand,
a buyer who trades with a connected seller can promise to make a repayment in the cen-
tralized location in order to consume more than what his money holdings permit him to
purchase. So long as the repayment amount is individually rational, a buyer who trades
with a connected seller will be able to consume more in the day market.
Although the possibility of trading with credit on the decentralized market may seem
attractive for buyers, the following result shows that there can be no equilibrium in which
money and private debt coexist.
19Proposition 3 With a constant money supply, the unique stationary monetary equilibrium
is a pure monetary equilibrium in which the quantity ^ x is traded in the decentralized market.
Let us carefully explain the previous result, which may seem surprising initially. To
prove Proposition 2, we essentially showed that the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint
cannot be satis￿ed in equilibrium so that there is no incentive-feasible repayment amount.
Why is it so di¢ cult to satisfy (16)? Notice that on the right-hand side of (16) we no longer
have the payo⁄ of autarky for the buyer as we had in the pure credit economy. In fact, the
buyer￿ s outside option consists of exclusively using money to trade in an environment in
which the value of money is constant over time. On the left-hand side, we have the buyer￿ s
disutility of repaying the loan amount y ￿x+￿ plus the value of continuing to trade using
credit. With a stable value of money (zero in￿ ation), agents are able to self-insure at a
low cost, e⁄ectively raising the value of default. As a result, each buyer has an additional
incentive to default on his liabilities. Because sellers anticipate this, they extend no credit
in the decentralized market.
With the introduction of ￿at money, we have essentially provided households with an
alternative mechanism to trade on the decentralized market. As a result, this has critically
a⁄ected the functioning of the credit system. In particular, the credit system is not used
because now it is more di¢ cult to induce buyers to cooperate.4 As we will show later,
it is necessary to implement a positive in￿ ation rate to induce buyers to fully repay their
liabilities when they use credit.
Even though the introduction of ￿at money eliminates consumption risk, buyers consume
less than the unconstrained e¢ cient quantity q￿. In the next section, we study how policy
intervention can a⁄ect the functioning of the private credit system.
4Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007) obtain a similar result.
205. WELFARE-IMPROVING POLICIES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC
INFORMATION
In this section, we discuss the possibility of government intervention. We want to investi-
gate the extent to which a policy intervention can improve upon the laissez-faire economy by
altering the real rate of return on money. To be in line with the recent literature on optimal
policy, we want to clearly de￿ne what is actually incentive-feasible for the government. In
particular, we focus on two constraints.
First, any intervention must result in a net transfer of ￿at money to private agents in
order to respect voluntary trade. This is in line with Andolfatto (2010), who imposes
voluntary trade as a restriction on the set of incentive-feasible policies to rule out lump-sum
tax as an instrument. In addition to voluntary trade, it makes sense in our environment to
impose a second constraint on the government￿ s ability to intervene in the economy: We
assume that any transfer of assets to private agents must be conditional on the available
public information. We motivate this constraint on the government policies as essentially a
technological restriction that limits the extent to which the government can make transfers
to private agents to alter the rate of return on money. We believe this is a relevant constraint
in the context of a credit economy in which it is costly for agents to report their trades.
As a result, any information the government has about the economy is necessarily reported
by agents so that the government needs to interact with the clearinghouse to implement
any policy: The transfer of assets can be made only to those who have reported their trades
and identities to the clearinghouse. Recall that the clearinghouse keeps a public record of
reports and identities.
We consider the same monetary mechanism as Andolfatto (2010): An agent who holds
M units of money in the day subperiod and has his trade reported to the clearinghouse can
transform his balances into RM ￿ T units of money. Here R is the gross nominal interest
rate announced by the government and T represents a redemption fee.
Notice that this kind of intervention creates an additional incentive for agents to report
their trades: Not only do public transactions allow credit arrangements within the private
21sector, but they also permit an agent to receive a net transfer of ￿at money. The government
can intervene in the economy only if the clearinghouse is used to settle private transactions.
The government can induce agents to report their trades by paying interest on money
holdings; that is, the bene￿t of reporting a trade is not only to have access to credit but
also to be able to receive an interest payment. However, if it is very expensive to report
a transaction, then a buyer who is paired with a connected seller may prefer not to use
credit nor to receive an interest payment; as a result, the clearinghouse is not used. In this
case, all trade is carried out with ￿at currency. Thus, all transactions in the economy are
anonymous and the government cannot intervene.
5.1. Government￿ s Budget Constraint
The government￿ s budget constraint is given by
￿Tt + ￿ Mt ￿ ￿ Mt￿1 = (Rt ￿ 1)￿ ￿ Mt￿1.
We have anticipated that, in a monetary equilibrium, all buyers who have access to credit
choose to use it by reporting their trades to the clearinghouse. We have also anticipated
that, at the beginning of the day subperiod at date t, each buyer holds ￿ Mt￿1 units of money
and that sellers carry no money into the decentralized market. We will show later that, in
a monetary equilibrium, this will be the endogenous distribution of money holdings across
agents at the beginning of the day subperiod. As a result, aggregate interest payments are
given by (R ￿ 1)￿ ￿ Mt￿1, with an aggregate revenue from the redemption fee equal to ￿Tt.
We restrict attention to monetary policy rules for which the money supply grows at a
constant gross rate ￿ > 0 ( ￿ Mt = ￿ ￿ Mt￿1 for all t ￿ 0) and the gross interest rate is constant
over time (Rt = R ￿ 1 for all t ￿ 0). As in the previous section, let ￿t denote the value of
money in the centralized location at date t. Thus, we can rewrite the government￿ s budget










225.2. Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
The terms of trade are exactly the same as in section 4.1.
5.3. Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Here we describe the bargaining problem between a buyer and a connected seller. Suppose
initially that the buyer wants to have his trade reported. De￿ne ’t (D) = maxfD;RtD ￿ Ttg.




[u(q) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD],
subject to the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿q ￿ ￿ + ￿tL + ￿t’t (D) ￿ 0,
the buyer￿ s cash constraint (5), and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint (8). As
in the previous section, v denotes the buyer￿ s expected discounted utility at the end of the
night subperiod, and ^ v denotes his expected discounted utility upon default. If the buyer
chooses not to trade with the seller in the day subperiod, he will not be able to receive
interest payments because there will be no transaction to be reported to the clearinghouse.
For this reason, the buyer￿ s surplus from trade is given by u(q) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD.
Suppose that Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1 < (q￿ + ￿ + ￿tTt)=￿tRt. The buyer￿ s surplus from trade as a
function of D and L is
Sr
t (D;L) = u(￿tL + ￿tD ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD,
if 0 < D < Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1, or
Sr
t (D;L) = u(￿tL + ￿t (RtD ￿ Tt) ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD,
if D ￿ Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1.
Now if ￿t maxfRtM ￿ Tt;Mg ￿ ￿ < q￿, then we must have D = M and L > 0 at the





23subject to (8). If the constraint (8) binds, we have that L = (v ￿ ^ v)=￿t. Otherwise, the
repayment amount is given by
L = (q￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿tM)=￿t if M < Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1
or
L = [q￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿t (RtM ￿ Tt)]=￿t if Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1 ￿ M < (q￿ + ￿ + ￿tTt)=￿tRt.
Again, let ￿r
t (M;v; ^ v) denote the buyer￿ s payo⁄ from trading with a connected seller
when the trade is reported to the clearinghouse. Finally, the seller sends the report
f(i;j);(q;D;L)g to the clearinghouse.
Suppose now that the buyer chooses not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse.
Then, the buyer￿ s problem is the same as the one he faces when meeting with an unconnected
seller.
5.4. Buyer￿ s Bellman Equation
Each buyer takes the value of money f￿tg
1




as given when making his individual decisions. The buyer￿ s problem can be formulated in









t+1 (M;v; ^ v);￿a
t+1 (M)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M) + v
￿￿
. (18)
Given v and ^ v, let M￿ denote the solution to the maximization problem on the right-hand
side of (18). Conjecture that, in a monetary equilibrium, agents ￿nd it optimal to exercise
the option of receiving interest payments from the government. As in the previous section,
let y denote the buyer￿ s daytime consumption if he reports his trade to the clearinghouse,
and let x denote his daytime consumption if he does not report the trade. Suppose that at




t+1 (M￿;v; ^ v) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
￿ ￿￿tM￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
24In this case, the buyer ￿nds it optimal to have his trade reported. Thus, we can rewrite
(18) as
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x],
with the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint given by




x+(1 ￿ ￿) ^ v.
We have that y = q￿ if the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint does not bind so that
the socially e¢ cient quantity will be traded in each bilateral meeting that is reported to
the clearinghouse.




t+1 (M￿;v; ^ v) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
< ￿￿tM￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
In this case, the buyer ￿nds it optimal not to have his trade reported: He prefers to
exclusively trade with money regardless of the type of his trading partner in the next
decentralized market. Then, we can rewrite (18) as
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿￿~ x + ￿u(~ x),
with ~ x given by




In this case, a buyer who is paired with a connected seller chooses not to report his trade
so that he exclusively uses ￿at money to pay for his purchases in the decentralized market.
Finally, for ￿at money and private debt to coexist as means of payment, the following
condition must hold in equilibrium:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿￿~ x + ￿u(~ x). (20)
Otherwise, an equilibrium is one in which all trades in the decentralized market are carried
out with ￿at money. Condition (20) says that, when choosing how much money to carry
into the decentralized market, a buyer prefers to have his trade reported when matched
with a connected seller over not having it reported and trading with ￿at money only.
255.5. The Value of Defection
As in the previous section, if a buyer fails to make a repayment in the centralized location,
then he will be able to use only ￿at money to pay for his future purchases. Here we also
assume that the government refuses to make interest payments to a defaulter.5 Thus, the
value of defection ^ v satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
^ v = max
^ M2R+
n









As in the previous section, let z denote the buyer￿ s consumption following defection. Then,
we can rewrite (21) as
(1 ￿ ￿) ^ v = ￿￿z + ￿u(z),
Upon defaulting on his private liability, a buyer produces and sells ￿z units of the consump-
tion good in the Walrasian market to acquire money balances at date t. Then, he takes
these proceeds into the decentralized market at date t + 1 to purchase z units of the good.
Notice that z = ~ x.
5.6. Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
In a stationary monetary equilibrium, the distribution of money holdings across agents
at the beginning of the day subperiod at date t is such that each buyer holds ￿ Mt￿1 units
of money and sellers have no money. The distribution of money holdings at the beginning
of the night subperiod at date t is such that each seller holds ￿ Mt units of money and
buyers have no money. An agent ￿nds it optimal to receive interest payments if and only if
(R ￿ 1)x ￿ T ￿ 0. Using (17), this condition holds if and only if:
￿ ￿ 1 (22)
5This assumption ensures that a defaulter will be able to trade on the decentralized market with ￿at money
only. Not only does a defaulter lose access to credit, but he also is not able to receive interest payments from
the government. One important implication is that a higher in￿ ation rate punishes defaulters and induces
cooperation in the credit market.
26and
R ￿ 1. (23)
For a monetary equilibrium to exist, we also need to have that:
￿￿t + ￿R￿t+1 ￿ 0, (24)
at each date t. Otherwise, agents would demand an in￿nite amount of money in the Wal-
rasian market, and, as a consequence, a monetary equilibrium would not exist. In a sta-







A stationary monetary equilibrium in which aggregate real money balances are constant
over time necessarily satis￿es (25). Notice that (25) simply says that the real return on
money cannot exceed the agents￿rate of time preference.
Finally, a government￿ s policy (￿;R) needs to satisfy (22), (23), and (25) to be incentive-
feasible.
De￿nition 4 For any given incentive-feasible policy (￿;R), a stationary monetary equilib-
rium with credit is a triple (x;y;z), with z = ~ x, satisfying the nonnegativity of the repayment
amount,







the ￿rst-order condition for the optimal choice of money balances,




and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x]




x ￿ ￿~ x + ￿u(~ x), (28)
with y = q￿ if (28) does not bind.
27Notice that condition (28) is simply the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint stated
in terms of the quantities x and y. Notice also that (26) and (28) imply that (20) holds. If
an equilibrium with credit exists, then we can have either an unconstrained equilibrium (in
which case the buyer gets y = q￿ from a connected seller) or a constrained equilibrium (in
which case the buyer gets y < q￿ from a connected seller). If a stationary monetary equilib-
rium with credit does not exist, then the unique stationary equilibrium is a pure monetary
equilibrium in which the quantity ^ x is traded in each bilateral meeting in the decentralized
market. In this case, there can be no intervention because no public information is created
(all trades are anonymous) so that the money supply remains constant over time.
In an equilibrium in which ￿at money and private debt coexist, we have that x ￿ y,
which means that a buyer who reports his trade to the clearinghouse is able to consume
more than a buyer who cannot obtain credit from his trading partner. A buyer who trades
with an unconnected seller faces a cash constraint that can eventually bind. On the other
hand, a buyer who trades with a connected seller can promise to make a repayment in the
centralized location in order to consume more than what his money holdings permit him
to purchase in the decentralized market. So long as the repayment amount is individually
rational, a buyer who trades with a connected seller will be able to consume more in the
day subperiod.
6. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
In this section, we characterize the optimal policy rule subject to the implementation
constraint that all trade has to be voluntary and that all monetary transfers to private agents
have to be conditional on the available public information. The social welfare associated
with an equilibrium with credit (x;y;z) is given by
￿ [u(y) ￿ y] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿￿, (29)
and the social welfare associated with an equilibrium without credit is given by
u(^ x) ￿ ^ x. (30)
28Without a credit system, the only allocation that can be implemented (other than autarky)
is one in which each buyer gets ^ x from a seller in the decentralized market and produces ^ x
in the centralized location. All trades are anonymous so that the private sector does not
create any public information on which the government can condition its transfers.
Notice that x = y = q￿ maximizes the social welfare associated with an equilibrium with
credit. If we can implement the socially e¢ cient quantity q￿, then the maximum welfare
level is given by
u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿￿.
We say that a society has a low record-keeping cost if the following holds:
u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿￿ > u(^ x) ￿ ^ x. (31)
In this case, the equilibrium with credit dominates the pure monetary equilibrium without
intervention, provided that the socially e¢ cient quantity q￿ can be implemented by an
incentive-feasible policy. Thus, our ￿rst step is to verify whether the socially e¢ cient
quantity can indeed be implemented.
Lemma 5 x ￿ ~ x in an unconstrained monetary stationary equilibrium, with x = ~ x if and
only if (25) holds with equality.
The previous result shows that we must have x = ~ x = q￿ in order to implement the
socially e¢ cient allocation. However, we show next that there is no incentive-feasible policy
that can implement x = ~ x = q￿ as an unconstrained equilibrium.
Proposition 6 The unconstrained e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented as a station-
ary monetary equilibrium.
It is not possible for the government to eliminate the consumption risk that a buyer
faces in the decentralized market (in an unconstrained equilibrium). With probability ￿, a
buyer consumes q￿ because his trade is reported to the clearinghouse, and with probability
291￿￿, he consumes less than q￿ because his money holdings are insu¢ cient to purchase the
quantity q￿ from his trading partner. The government cannot induce him to carry more
money balances into the decentralized market so that the e¢ cient quantity cannot be traded
in a bilateral meeting between a buyer and an unconnected seller.
We now characterize the optimal monetary policy rule under the assumption that the
buyers have CRRA preferences.






, with the coe¢ cient of rel-
ative risk aversion satisfying ￿ < 1 and with b 2 (0;1).
The optimal monetary policy requires (25) to hold with equality so that we can guarantee
that the buyer￿ s daytime consumption when trading with an unconnected seller is the highest
possible. This is the way in which we can implement the Friedman rule without resorting
to lump-sum taxes.
Proposition 7 For ￿ small and ￿ ￿ ￿, there exists a unique ￿ ￿ > 1 such that, with x = ~ x
and y = q￿, (26) holds as a strict inequality and (28) holds with equality. As a result,
(x;y;z) = (~ x;q￿; ~ x) is an unconstrained stationary monetary equilibrium in which the re-
payment amount is strictly positive.
With CRRA preferences, the repayment amount in an unconstrained equilibrium is
strictly increasing in the money growth factor ￿, which means that the higher the long-
run in￿ ation rate (which is also given by ￿), the larger the repayment amount is. As we
would expect, credit becomes relatively more important in transactions as the in￿ ation rate
rises. Notice that the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint can be satis￿ed only for val-
ues of ￿ above the threshold value ￿ ￿, which means that a stationary monetary equilibrium
in which the credit system is operative exists if and only if the money growth factor is
su¢ ciently large (in particular, above the threshold value ￿ ￿).
Notice that there are two e⁄ects on the buyer￿ s incentives to move away from credit as
we vary ￿. First, a higher return on money (lower ￿ for any given R) gives agents an
30additional incentive to default on their liabilities and, consequently, abandon the credit
system. Second, a higher return on money lowers the buyer￿ s opportunity cost of holding
such an asset, making it more valuable as an alternative to credit. Lenders (sellers) are
aware of this e⁄ect and, consequently, reduce the loan amounts they are willing to extend.
Finally, we need to verify whether the welfare associated with the allocation (~ x;q￿; ~ x) is
greater than the welfare associated with the equilibrium without credit (the pure monetary
equilibrium ^ x). Speci￿cally, we need to verify whether the following holds:
￿ [u(q￿) ￿ q￿] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(~ x) ￿ ~ x] ￿ ￿￿ > u(^ x) ￿ ^ x. (32)
The left-hand side of (32) gives the expected surplus from trade associated with an equilib-
rium in which ￿at money and credit coexist as a means of payment, whereas the right-hand
side of (32) gives the expected surplus associated with the pure monetary economy. No-
tice that q￿ is the surplus-maximizing quantity so that u(q￿) ￿ q￿ > u(^ x) ￿ ^ x. However,
condition (32) may not hold when the cost ￿ is relatively large.
Proposition 8 Suppose that ￿ ￿ ￿ is su¢ ciently close to one and ￿ is su¢ ciently small
such that (32) holds. Let ￿ ￿ > 1 be the threshold value for the money growth factor as de￿ned
in Proposition 5. Let ~ x be given by




Then, the allocation (~ x;q￿; ~ x) achieves the highest welfare level.
This means that only a society with a su¢ ciently sophisticated record-keeping technology
can bene￿t from public transactions. Not only do public transactions allow credit arrange-
ments within the private sector, but they also permit the government to alter the rate of
return on money. If the number of transactions that is reported in equilibrium is large rela-





social welfare is bigger. This means that public trades are socially desirable so long as the
cost of reporting private trades is low and the relative fraction of these trades is su¢ ciently
large.
317. DISCUSSION
In the pure credit economy, buyers not only face consumption risk in the decentralized
market, but they also may consume less than the surplus-maximizing quantity q￿ in a credit
trade if they are credit-constrained. Thus, we conclude that, regardless of the available
record-keeping technology, there is a social role for ￿at money in transactions and for an
active monetary policy. Indeed, we have shown that it is possible to implement welfare-
improving policies even if we restrict these policies to respect voluntary trade and the
constraint that all transfers to private agents must be contingent on the available public
information. In particular, it is necessary to have an active monetary policy to guarantee
that the surplus-maximizing quantity q￿ is traded in each match involving a connected seller
(Propositions 3 & 7).
In Andolfatto (2010), any incentive-feasible policy rule for which R=￿ = ￿￿1 (a version
of the Friedman rule) implements the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation in a pure monetary
economy. In particular, the monetary authority can implement such an allocation with
zero in￿ ation by setting (￿;R) =
￿
1;￿￿1￿
. As a result, there is no social role for credit.
Andolfatto￿ s results depend crucially on the assumption that the monetary authority is
able to evenly raise the real return on money across all money holders. In our analysis, we
impose the constraint that the transfers to agents have to be conditional on the available
public information. Because the record-keeping technology is not available to all sellers, the
monetary authority is unable to directly raise the real return on money for the subgroup
of traders who temporarily cannot report their trades. Notice that, in principle, it could
indirectly raise the real return on money for this subgroup of agents by means of a de￿ a-
tionary policy. But we have shown that such a policy is not incentive-feasible under the
implementation restrictions we have considered.
We have shown that setting R=￿ = ￿￿1 (Friedman rule) does not implement the uncon-
strained e¢ cient allocation (Proposition 6). As we have seen, this policy equalizes the real
rate of return on money with the rate of time preference only for the subgroup of traders
who are currently able to report their trades. From Proposition 7, a necessary and su¢ -
32cient condition for optimality is to have both R=￿ = ￿￿1 and ￿ = ￿ ￿ > 1. This means that
a slightly positive in￿ ation rate is required to support cooperation in the credit system;
that is, an in￿ ation rate of at least ￿ ￿ is required to guarantee that the buyer￿ s individual
rationality constraint is satis￿ed so that credit transactions are indeed incentive-feasible.
Why should the monetary authority choose the minimum incentive-feasible in￿ ation rate
consistent with an unconstrained monetary equilibrium? As we have seen, any money
growth factor above ￿ ￿ results in a strictly lower value for x, reducing the value of the social
welfare function. Notice that those who are able to use credit in their current transactions
are essentially ￿protected￿against in￿ ation: Even though in￿ ation raises the opportunity
cost of holding money, those who have their trades reported receive an o⁄setting interest
payment, completely eliminating the opportunity cost of holding money provided that R =
￿￿1￿. On the other hand, those who are currently unable to report their trades endure a
cost of holding money. In principle, the monetary authority would want to use in￿ ation as an
instrument to induce cooperation in the credit system (a punishment on those who default
on their debts). However, there are always some traders in the economy who currently
do not have an opportunity to use credit and who would be punished if the in￿ ation rate
were too high. For this reason, the monetary authority wants to choose the minimum
incentive-feasible in￿ ation rate.
Finally, it is important to discuss the nature of our monetary mechanism. In particular,
why do we think it is relevant? Our analysis explicitly assumes that monetary policy is
implemented through the payment/credit system. We initially imposed such a restriction
to essentially preserve a social role for credit arrangements. Our monetary mechanism
is a relevant institutional arrangement if we consider the possibility of using monetary
policy to enhance the payment/credit system. In reality, monetary policy implementation
is much more complex than what our simple mechanism suggests (speci￿cally, it involves
the purchase and sale of government securities in the open market, the creation of liquidity
facilities such as the discount window, and recently the payment of interest on reserves).
However, our analysis focuses on the interaction between monetary policy and the private
credit system, in which case our theoretical mechanism provides a useful characterization.
33Even though we restricted the monetary authority to intervene through the credit/payment
system, we have shown that it is possible to a⁄ect the sellers￿incentives to extend credit as
well as the buyers￿incentives to fully repay their debts.
8. CONCLUSION
We have taken the view that ￿at money complements the use of credit as a means of
payment and have characterized the way in which monetary policy a⁄ects the functioning
of the credit system. In our analysis, credit arrangements are constrained by the borrowers￿
inability to commit to fully repay their debts and by the available record-keeping technology.
We have characterized the equilibrium allocations of a pure credit economy and have shown
that (due to a technological restriction) there is a social role for ￿at money. Then, we
have shown that an active monetary policy is su¢ cient for relaxing the credit constraints.
Finally, we have shown that if credit arrangements are essential, then the optimal monetary
policy entails a positive in￿ ation rate in order to induce cooperation in the credit system.
One limitation of our analysis is that we explicitly abstracted from other aspects of
monetary policy. Speci￿cally, we restricted attention to the design of policies that aim
at in￿ uencing the e⁄ectiveness of credit arrangements. However, our monetary mechanism
allowed us to provide a useful characterization of the interactions between optimal monetary
policy and credit arrangements.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3
Notice that for any pair (x;y),
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x]
< ￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)y + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x]
￿ ￿u(￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)y ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)x
￿ ￿^ x + ￿u(^ x).
In the second step, we used the fact that the utility function u : R+ ! R+ is strictly
concave. Hence, the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint (16) cannot be satis￿ed for
36any (x;y). This implies that there can be no credit in equilibrium. As a result, the unique
stationary monetary equilibrium is one in which ^ x is traded in each bilateral meeting in the
decentralized market. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5











Because the utility function u : R+ ! R+ is strictly concave, we conclude that x ￿ ~ x as
claimed. In particular, if R = ￿￿1￿, then from (27) we have x = ~ x. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6












which means that the maximum daytime consumption (in an unconstrained equilibrium)
for a buyer who is paired with an unconnected seller is ~ x < q￿. Since the socially e¢ cient
allocation can be implemented only as an unconstrained equilibrium, (33) implies that such
an allocation is infeasible. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
De￿ne the function ’(￿) by
’(￿) = ￿￿u(q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(~ x) ￿ ~ x]




(1 ￿ ￿) ~ x.
Under Assumption 1, we have that ’0 (￿) > 0 for all ￿. Notice that ’(￿) < 0. Also, we
have that
’(1) = ￿￿u(q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿) ￿ [￿￿u(^ x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿) ^ x] < 0.
37Finally, notice that ’(￿) > 0 for ￿ su¢ ciently large. To verify this claim, observe that
￿￿u(q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿) > 0
for ￿ su¢ ciently close to one. Also, we have that, for any ￿ ￿ 1,




(￿ ￿ 1) ~ x.
Because both ~ x ! 0 and ￿~ x ! 0 as ￿ ! 1, we must have ’(￿) > 0 for some ￿ su¢ ciently
large. As a result, there exists a unique ￿ ￿ > 1 such that (28) holds with equality at x = ~ x
and y = q￿.
Now we need to verify whether the repayment amount is nonnegative. De￿ne the function
  (￿) by






1 + ￿￿1 (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
,
which gives the repayment amount as a function of ￿. We have that  0 (￿) > 0 for all
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿). Notice that (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1 if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿. Because
  (1) > 0, we have that   (￿) is strictly increasing for any ￿ ￿ 1. This means that for
the value ￿ ￿ such that ’(￿ ￿) = 0 we also have that   (￿ ￿) > 0. Therefore, we conclude that
(x;y;z) = (~ x;q￿; ~ x), with ~ x given by
u0 (~ x) = ￿￿1￿ ￿,
is an unconstrained stationary monetary equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
Given condition (32), it follows immediately from Proposition 5. Q.E.D.
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